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Abstract—We consider a two-user secure computation prob-
lem in which Alice and Bob communicate interactively in order to
compute some deterministic functions of the inputs. The privacy
requirement is that each user should not learn any additional
information about a function of the inputs other than what can
be inferred from its own input and output. For the distribution-
free setting, i.e., when the protocol must be correct and private for
any joint input distribution, we completely characterize the set
of all securely computable functions. When privacy is required
only against Bob who computes a function based on a single
transmission from Alice, we show that asymptotically secure
computability is equivalent to perfectly secure computability.
Separately, we consider an eavesdropper who has access to all
the communication and should not learn any information about
some function of the inputs (possibly different from the functions
to be computed by the users) and show that interaction may be
necessary for secure computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of two-user secure computation (see [1] and
reference therein) is for users to interactively compute a function
without revealing any additional information about their inputs
other than what can be inferred from their own inputs and
output. In some settings, privacy might be desired only for
certain attributes of the data and not the entire input. This
motivates the study of the following problem.
We consider a two-user secure computation problem in
which Alice and Bob communicate interactively in order to
compute some deterministic functions of the inputs. Unlike in
standard secure computation, our privacy requirement is that
each user should not learn any additional information about a
function of the inputs other than what can be inferred from its
own input and output. Separately, we consider an eavesdropper
who has access to all the communication and should not learn
any information about some function of the inputs (possibly
different from the functions to be computed by the users).
Two-user secure computation was formally introduced in the
context of computational secrecy by Yao in his seminal works
[2], [3]. Information theoretically, secure computation among n
users was studied by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson [4]
and Chaum, Crepe`au, and Damga˚rd [5] independently. They
showed that any function can be securely computed even if
t < n2 (t <
n
3 , resp.) honest-but-curious (malicious, resp.) users
collude.
Not all functions are securely computable by two users
interacting over a noiseless link1 (e.g., binary AND function
1Note that if the two users have access to a noisy channel or correlated
random variables, a larger class of functions may be securely computed [6]. A
characterization of such stochastic resources which allow any function to be
securely computed is given in [7].
is not securely computable by two users). Beaver [8] and
Kushilevitz [9] gave a combinatorial characterization of two-
user securely computable deterministic functions. Maji et
al. [10] showed that the same characterization holds for
statistically secure protocols also. Narayan et al. [11] gave an
alternate characterization using common randomness generated
by interactive deterministic secure protocols. Data et al. [12]
gave single-letter characterizations of feasibility and optimal
communication rates for two-user interactive secure randomized
function computation.
Tyagi et al. [13], Tyagi [14], and Gohari et al. [15] studied
secure computation when a certain function of inputs to the
users needs to be hidden from an eavesdropper having access
to the communication. Lindell et al. [16] studied input-size
hiding secure computation. Basciftci et al. [17] and Kalantari et
al. [18] studied privacy versus utility trade-offs in data release
mechanisms where the input data comprises of some useful
data (whose information revealed by the output data quantifies
utility) and some sensitive data (whose information revealed
by the output data quantifies privacy leakage).
Our main results are as follows:
• In our two-user secure computation problem, for the
distribution-free setting, i.,e., when the protocol must
be correct and private for any joint input distribution
(see Claim 1), we completely characterize the set of
all securely computable functions (Theorem 1).
• When privacy is required only against Bob who com-
putes a function based on a single transmission from
Alice, we show that asymptotically secure computabil-
ity is equivalent to perfectly secure computability
(Theorem 2).
• When privacy is required against an eavesdropper,
Tyagi et al. [13] studied a special case where the
function that needs to be hidden from the eavesdropper
is same as the one computed by the users and showed
that interaction is not necessary for secure computation.
Later, Tyagi [14] studied a larger class of functions
where the function that needs to be hidden from
an eavesdropper is equal to one of the functions
computed by the users and gave a characterization
of secure computability for a class of functions. The
protocol used for achievability there involves interactive
communication. We ask the complementary question:
Is interaction necessary for secure computation? We
answer this question in the affirmative through an
example (Example 3).
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II. PRIVACY AGAINST USERS THEMSELVES
A. Distribution-Free Setting
Alice Bob
...
x
f(x, y)
y
f(x, y)
g(x, y) h(x, y)
m1
m2
mt
Fig. 1: Secure computation with privacy against users them-
selves. Alice and Bob communicate interactively in order to
compute f(x, y) such that Alice (resp.Bob) should not learn
any additional information about g(x, y) (resp. h(x, y)) other
than what can be inferred from her (resp. his) input and f(x, y).
Consider two honest-but-curious (semi-honest) users Alice
and Bob having inputs x and y respectively. They communicate
interactively over many rounds to compute a function f(x, y)
privately, that is, Alice (resp. Bob) should not learn any
additional information about g(x, y) (resp. h(x, y)) other than
what can be inferred from her (resp. his) input and the
function value f(x, y) (see Figure 1). The users alternately
send messages to each other, i.e., the message mi that a
user sends in the ith round is a function of its input, all
the messages it has seen so far m1,m2, . . . ,mi−1, and its
private randomness. Let m denote the communication string
of messages m1,m2, . . . ,mt that are sent during the protocol.
We say that the protocol Π computes the function f(x, y)
correctly2 if P (Π(x, y) = f(x, y)) > 0.5. We say that a
protocol for computing f(x, y) is private against Alice with
respect to g(x, y) if for every two inputs (x, y1) and (x, y2)
satisfying g(x, y1) 6= g(x, y2) and f(x, y1) = f(x, y2), and
for every communication string m, p(m|x, y1) = p(m|x, y2).
Similarly, we say that a protocol for computing f(x, y) is
private against Bob with respect to h(x, y) if for every two
inputs (x1, y) and (x2, y) satisfying h(x1, y) 6= h(x2, y) and
f(x1, y) = f(x2, y), and for every communication string m,
p(m|x1, y) = p(m|x2, y). Now, the following claim gives an
alternative definition for the privacy..
Claim 1. A protocol Π is private against Alice and Bob with
respect to the functions f(x, y) and h(x, y) if and only if for
all the input distributions pXY , we have I(M ;G|F,X) =
I(M ;H|F, Y ) = 0, where F = f(X,Y ), G = g(X,Y ), and
H = h(X,Y ).
This claim is proved in the Appendix.
A function triple (f(x, y), g(x, y), h(x, y)) is said to be
securely computable if there exists a protocol computing f(x, y)
that is private against Alice and Bob with respect to the
functions g(x, y) and h(x, y), respectively. We recover the
standard two-user secure computation problem [9] by setting
g(x, y) = y and h(x, y) = x.
We define x1 ∼X x2 if ∃y s.t. g(x1, y) 6= g(x2, y) and
f(x1, y) = f(x2, y). An equivalence relation ≡X on X is
defined as the reflexive, transitive closure of the relation ∼X .
2While the definition involves any probability of error strictly less than 0.5,
the protocol presented in the proof of Theorem 1 achieves perfect correctness,
i.e., P (Π(x, y) = f(x, y)) = 1.
Similarly, the relations ∼Y and ≡Y are defined on Y also. Let R
be the matrix corresponding to f(x, y) with entry in row x and
column y equal to f(x, y). A matrix is called monochromatic
if all its entries are equal.
Definition 1. A matrix is called forbidden (for functions g and
h) if it is not monochromatic, all x’s are equivalent (under
≡X ), and all y’s are equivalent (under ≡Y ).
Then, we have the following theorem which characterizes
the set of all securely computable function triples.
Theorem 1. A function triple (f(x, y), g(x, y), h(x, y)) is
securely computable if and only if the corresponding matrix R
does not contain a forbidden sub-matrix.
Trivially, for constant functions g(x, y) = h(x, y) = c,
every function f(x, y) is securely computable with respect to
the functions g(x, y) and h(x, y). Here we give a non-trivial
example.
Example 1. In this example, we give a non-trivial function
f(x, y) which is not securely computable under the standard
notion of privacy [9] but is securely computable under the
weaker notion of privacy with respect to some functions g(x, y)
and h(x, y). The matrix corresponding to a function f(x, y) is
given in Table I. Under the standard notion of privacy [9],
i.e., when g(x, y) = y and h(x, y) = x, f(x, y) is not
securely computable because the matrix itself is a forbidden
matrix. However, when g(x, y) = g˜(y) and h(x, y) = h˜(x)
TABLE I: A function triple (f(x, y), g˜(y), h˜(x)).
Y
f(x, y) y1 y2 y3 h˜(x)
x1 0 0 1 1
X x2 0 1 1 1
x3 2 1 0 2
g˜(y) 1 2 2
where the functions g˜(y) and h˜(x) are shown in Table I,
by Theorem 1, the function triple (f(x, y), g(x, y), h(x, y))
is securely computable.
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof leverages and extends the
proof techniques of [9, Theorems 1 and 2]. Recall that
p(m1,m2, . . . ,mt|x, y) =
p(m1|x)p(m2|y,m1) . . . p(mt−1|x,m1, . . . ,mt−2)
× p(mt|y,m1, . . . ,mt−1),
where it is assumed that t is even, without loss of generality.
‘Only if’ part: Suppose the matrix R corresponding to
(f(x, y), g(x, y), h(x, y)) has a forbidden sub-matrix N =
{x1, . . . , xl} × {y1, . . . , yk} and that there exists a secure
protocol. Without loss of generality, the last message sent
in the protocol Π is assumed to contain the function computed
and is denoted by Π(x, y). Since N is forbidden, all xi’s are
equivalent and can be ordered in a way so that for every i > 1
there exists i′ < i such that xi ∼X xi′ . A similar ordering
exists on yj’s also. We shall show that p(m1, . . . ,mt|xi, yj) =
p(m1, . . . ,mt|x1, y1) for every (xi, yj) ∈ N . Then, the
probability distribution of communication messages is same
for any (xi, yj) ∈ N , which, in turn implies that the last
message (i.e., f(x, y)) of the communication message is
distributed in the same way. Since N is not monochromatic
this contradicts the correctness of the protocol, P (Π(xi, yj) =
f(xi, yj)) > 0.5, for (xi, yj) ∈ N . It now remains to
show that p(m1, . . . ,mt|xi, yj) = p(m1, . . . ,mt|x1, y1) for
every (xi, yj) ∈ N . We show this by induction on the
number of rounds t. For i > 1, there is some i′ < i such
that xi ∼X xi′ . So, there exists y s.t. g(xi, y) 6= g(xi′ , y)
and f(xi, y) = f(xi′ , y). Now, from the privacy condition
p(m1|xi) = p(m1|xi, y) = p(m1|xi′ , y) = p(m1|xi′). Re-
peating the same argument as above if i′ > 1, we get
p(m1|xi) = p(m1|xi′) = · · · = p(m1|x1). So, the base case
for t = 1 is true. Assume that
p(m1, . . . ,mt−1|xi, yj) = p(m1, . . . ,mt−1|x1, y1)
for every (xi, yj) ∈ N . If
p(m1, . . . ,mt−1|xi, yj) = p(m1, . . . ,mt−1|x1, y1) = 0
then it is trivial that
p(m1, . . . ,mt|xi, yj) = p(m1, . . . ,mt|x1, y1) = 0.
So, assume that
p(m1, . . . ,mt−1|xi, yj) = p(m1, . . . ,mt−1|x1, y1) 6= 0.
Without loss of generality, assume that t is even (odd t can be
handled similarly). Note that
p(m1, . . . ,mt|xi, yj) = p(m1, . . . ,mt−1|xi, yj)
× p(mt|yj ,m1, . . . ,mt−1). (1)
Since there is an ordering on yj’s, for j > 1, there is some
j′ < j such that yj ∼Y yj′ . So, there exists x s.t. h(x, yj) 6=
h(x, yj′) and f(x, yj) = f(x, yj′). Therefore, by (1) and the
privacy condition,
p(mt|yj ,m1, . . . ,mt−1) = p(mt|yj′ ,m1, . . . ,mt−1).
Repeating the same argument as above if j′ > 1, we get
p(mt|yj ,m1, . . . ,mt−1) = p(mt|y1,m1, . . . ,mt−1).
Hence, we have p(m1, . . . ,mt|xi, yj) = p(m1, . . . ,mt|x1, y1)
for every (xi, yj) ∈ N . This completes the ‘only if’ part of
the proof.
‘If’ part: We need the following definitions. A C × D-
matrix, C ⊆ X , D ⊆ Y , is rows decomposable if there exist
nonempty sets C1, . . . , Ct (t ≥ 2) such that
• C1, . . . , Ct form a partition of C.
• For every x1, x2 ∈ C, if x1 ∼X x2 then x1 and x2
are in the same Ci.
Similarly, we can define columns decomposability. A C ×D-
matrix K is decomposable if one of the following conditions
holds:
• K is monochromatic.
• K is rows decomposable to submatrices C1 × D-
matrix A1,. . . , Ct × D-matrix At, which are all in
turn decomposable.
• K is columns decomposable to submatrices C ×D1-
matrix B1,. . . , C×Dt-matrix Bt, which are all in turn
decomposable.
Note that for a C ×D-matrix, the optimal row decomposition
and the optimal column decomposition (optimal in the sense of
maximum number of subsets in the partition) are unique and
are determined by the equivalence classes under ≡X and ≡Y ,
respectively. Suppose the X × Y-matrix R corresponding to
the function f does not contain a forbidden sub-matrix. This
implies that R is a decomposable matrix. Consider the following
protocol. Let us assume that R is columns decomposable so
that Alice starts the protocol.
(1) Initialize C = X , D = Y , and the matrix K = R,
(2) While the C ×D-matrix K is non-monochromatic,
(a) Alice sends i such that x ∈ Ci, where the submatrices
C1 ×D-matrix A1, . . . , Ct ×D-matrix At, form the
optimal rows decomposition of the C ×D-matrix K.
Both users then set C = Ci and K = Ai.
(b) If the C ×D-matrix K is non-monochromatic, Bob
sends j such that y ∈ Dj , where the submatrices
C ×D1-matrix B1, . . . , C ×Dt-matrix Bt, form the
optimal columns decomposition of the C ×D-matrix
K. Both users then set D = Dj and K = Bj .
(3) Alice or Bob sends the constant value in the C×D-matrix
K as the value of f(x, y).
Now, we analyse the protocol for correctness and privacy. Since
the C×D-matrix is always decomposable and the input always
belongs to the C × D-matrix in every round, the algorithm
terminates with the correct value of f(x, y). As the protocol
above is deterministic, to show that the protocol is private
against Alice, it suffices to argue that the same communication
messages are transmitted for two inputs (x, y1) and (x, y2)
satisfying g(x, y1) 6= g(x, y2) and f(x, y1) = f(x, y2). This
is in fact true since the protocol never differentiates between
y1 and y2 because y1 ∼Y y2 in every iteration. Similarly, we
can argue that the protocol is also private against Bob. This
completes the ‘if’ part of the proof.
Remark 1. In standard secure computation [9], secure com-
putability with any full-support input distribution (e.g., uniform
distribution) is equivalent to secure computability in distribution-
free setting (and therefore with any other input distribution). In
contrast, for our secure computation problem, it turns out that
secure computability with a full-support input distribution, e.g.,
the uniform distribution, does not imply secure computability
with all other distributions (let alone in the distribution-free
setting). The following example illustrates this.
Example 2. Consider the following function f(x, y) with
x ∈ {0, 1} and y = (y′, y′′) ∈ {0, 1}2 in Table II. Suppose
TABLE II: f (x, (y′, y′′)) = x ∧ y′.
f(x, y) y = (0, 0) y = (0, 1) y = (1, 0) y = (1, 1)
x = 0 0 0 0 0
x = 1 0 0 1 1
g(x, y) = y′′ needs to be hidden from Alice and h(x, y) = x
needs to be hidden from Bob. Consider a protocol where
Bob sends y′ to Alice who computes the output and sends
it to Bob. It is easy to check that, for uniform distribution,
this protocol is secure. Now consider an input distribution
pXY = pX .pY with X ∼ Uniform{0, 1} and Y = (Y ′, Y ′′) ∼
Uniform{(00), (11)}. With this input distribution, there does
not exist a secure protocol since the problem reduces to two-
user secure computation of binary AND function (as Y ′ = Y ′′)
which is impossible [9].
Now we turn to secure computability with a fixed input
distribution.
B. Non-Interactive Setting With Input Distribution
Alice BobXn
Y n
M
Zn ≈ Fn
Gn
Fig. 2: Inputs are i.i.d. pXY . Asymptotically secure setting is
shown. Bob has to compute Zn that is approximately close to
Fn, Fi = f(Xi, Yi), while learning no additional information
about Gn, Gi = g(Xi, Yi).
Let the inputs to Alice and Bob are Xn and Y n, respectively,
where (Xi, Yi), i = 1, . . . , n, are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) with distribution pXY , where X and Y take
values in finite sets X and Y , respectively. In this section,
we restrict ourselves to the protocols that use single round of
communication. Assume that privacy is required only against
Bob who computes a function based on a single transmission
from Alice. We say that a triple (pXY , f(x, y), g(x, y)) is
asymptotically securely computable with no interaction if
there exists a sequence of conditional probability distributions
pM,Zn|XnY n := pM |XnpZn|M,Y n (see Figure 2) s.t. for every
 > 0,
P (Zn 6= Fn) ≤ , Fi = f(Xi, Yi), (2)
I(M ;Gn|Zn, Y n) ≤ n,Gi = g(Xi, Yi), (3)
for large enough n. We say that (pXY , f(x, y), g(x, y)) is
perfectly securely computable if there exists pU |XY s.t.
U −X − Y, (4)
H(F |U, Y ) = 0, (5)
I(U ;G|F, Y ) = 0. (6)
Instead of functions of inputs, suppose if the inputs and
outputs of users need to be hidden, our earlier work [12,
Theorem 1] shows that asymptotically secure computability
is equivalent to perfectly secure computability even with
interactive communication. However, this is not true for all
secure computation problems. In particular, as [12, Remark 2]
shows, this is not true for the problem of function computation
with privacy against an eavesdropper studied by Tyagi et al. [13].
The following theorem shows that such an equivalence holds
for non-interactive communication setting considered here.
Theorem 2. When privacy is required only against Bob who
computes a function based on a single transmission from Alice,
asymptotically secure computability is equivalent to perfectly
secure computability.
Remark 2. The problem of whether asymptotically secure
computability is equivalent to perfectly secure computability
for multiple rounds of communication remains open.
Proof: It is easy to see that perfectly secure computability
implies asymptotically secure computability since (4)-(6) define
a protocol with n = 1 and  = 0. For the other direction,
we single-letterize the constraints of asymptotically secure
computability to get (4)-(6). Notice that the joint distribution
of all the random variables is given by
pXn,Y n,Gn,Fn,M,Zn(x
n, yn, gn, fn,m, zn)
=
(
n∏
i=1
pXY (xi, yi)
)
pM |Xn(m|xn)pZn|M,Y n(zn|m, yn)
× 1{gi = g(xi, yi), fi = f(xi, yi), i ∈ [1 : n]}. (7)
Let T be a random variable uniformly distributed on [1 : n]
and independent of everything else. Privacy condition against
Bob, (3), implies that
n ≥ H(Gn|Zn, Y n)−H(Gn|M,Zn, Y n)
≥
n∑
i=1
[H(Gi|Fi, Yi)− 1]−
n∑
i=1
H(Gi|M,Zn, Y n, Gi−1)
(8)
≥
n∑
i=1
[H(Gi|Zi, Yi)− 1 − 2]
−
n∑
i=1
H(Gi|M,Y i−1, Y i+1:n, Zi, Yi) (9)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Gi|Zi, Yi)− n(1 + 2) (10)
= n[I(UT , T ;GT |ZT , YT )− I(T ;GT |ZT , YT )]
− n(1 + 2)
≥ nI(UT , T ;GT |ZT , YT )− n(1 + 2 + 3). (11)
We have used the following fact in (8), (9), and (11): if two
random variables A and A′ with same support set A satisfy
||pA − pA′ ||1 ≤  ≤ 1/4, then it follows from [19, Theorem
17.3.3] that |H(A)−H(A′)| ≤ η log |A|, where η → 0 as →
0. Now (2) implies that ‖pXn,Y n,Zn,Gn−pXn,Y n,Fn,Gn‖1 ≤ 
which in turn implies ‖pXTYTZTGT −pXY FG‖1 ≤  using [20,
Lemma VI.2]. These imply (8), (9), and (11) with 1, 2, 3 → 0
as → 0. (10) follows by defining Ui = (M,Y i−1, Y i+1:n).
From the asymptotically secure protocol, we have the
Markov chain Zn − (M,Y n) − Xn which implies that
Zn − (M,Y n) − (Xn, Fn) because Fn is a deterministic
function of (Xn, Y n). This further implies that Zi− (Ui, Yi)−
Fi, i ∈ [1 : n]. Now using Fano’s inequality [19, Theorem
2.10.1], this implies that, for i ∈ [1 : n],
H(Fi|Ui, Yi) ≤ P (Zi 6= Fi) ≤ P (Zn 6= Fn) ≤ , (12)
where the last inequality follows from (2). This gives us
H(FT |UT , T, YT ) ≤ . (13)
Consider
I(M,Y i−1, Y i+1:n;Yi|Xi)
≤ I(M,Y i−1, Y i+1:n, Xi−1, Xi+1:n;Yi|Xi)
= I(M ;Yi|Y i−1, Y i+1:n, Xn) (14)
≤ I(M ;Y n|Xn) = 0, (15)
where (14) follows because (Xi, Yi) is independent of
(Xi−1, Xi+1:n, Y i−1, Y i+1:n), and the last equality follows
from the Markov chain M −Xn − Y n. This gives us
(UT , T )−XT − YT (16)
Now using the continuity of total variation distance and mutual
information in the probability simplex along similar lines as [21,
Lemma 6], (4)-(6) follow from (11), (13), and (16), respectively.
III. PRIVACY AGAINST AN EAVESDROPPER
Xn Y n
Zn1 ≈ Fn1 Zn2 ≈ Fn2
Alice Bob...
Eavesdropper
M1
M2
Mr
Gn
Fig. 3: Inputs are i.i.d. pXY . Asymptotically secure setting is
shown. Alice and Bob communicate interactively in order to
compute Zn1 and Z
n
2 that are approximately close to F
n
1 and
Fn2 , respectively, Fki = fk(Xi, Yi), k ∈ [1 : 2], i ∈ [1 : n],
while hiding Gn, Gi = g(Xi, Yi) from an eavesdropper.
Let the inputs to Alice and Bob Xn and Y n, respectively,
where (Xi, Yi), i = 1, . . . , n, are i.i.d. with distribution
pXY , where X and Y take values in finite sets X and Y ,
respectively. Let Alice and Bob communicate interactively
and compute Zn1 and Z
n
2 , respectively. Let M[1:r] denote the
message transcript due to an interactive two-user protocol
Π and is accessible to an eavesdropper. We say that a tu-
ple (pXY , f1(x, y), f2(x, y), g(x, y)) is asymptotically securely
computable in r rounds with privacy against an eavesdropper
(see Figure 3) if there exists a sequence of interactive protocols
Πn such that, for every  > 0, there exists a large enough n
s.t.
P ((Zn1 , Z
n
2 ) 6= (Fn1 , Fn2 )) ≤ , (17)
I(M[1:r];G
n) ≤ n, . (18)
We say that a tuple (pXY , f1(x, y), f2(x, y), g(x, y)) is per-
fectly securely computable in r rounds if there exists a protocol
Πn with n = 1 such that (17)-(18) are satisfied with  = 0. It
is worthwhile to remark here that, in this setting, asymptotically
secure computability is not equivalent to perfectly secure
computability as pointed out in our earlier work [12, Remark
2].
Tyagi et al. [13] studied asymptotically secure computability
of this problem in multi-user setting for a special case where
the function that needs to be hidden from the eavesdropper is
same as the one computed by the users, i.e., f1 = f2 = g in the
current context. They showed that interaction is not necessary
for asymptotically secure computation, i.e, the protocol involves
each user publicly communicating only one message each which
is a randomized function of its own input. Later, Tyagi [14]
studied a larger class of functions where the function that
needs to be hidden from an eavesdropper is equal to one of the
functions computed by the users and gave a characterization of
secure computability for a class of functions. The protocol used
for achievability there involves interactive communication. We
ask the complementary question: Is interaction necessary for
secure computation, in particular, are there any function tuples
that are securely computable only using interactive protocols?
We answer this question in the affirmative through the following
example.
Example 3. Let Y = (Y0, Y1) be a vector of two independent
and uniformly distributed binary random variables and X is
another uniform binary random variable independent of Y .
Let pXY denote this joint distribution. Consider f1(x, y) =
f2(x, y) = yx and g(x, y) = yx¯, where x¯ denotes the
complement of x, i.e., x¯ = 1 − x. We show that this choice
of (pXY , f1(x, y), f2(x, y), g(x, y)) is not asymptotically se-
curely computable using non-interactive communication. We
prove this via contradiction. Suppose there exists a non-
interactive protocol that asymptotically securely computes
(pXY , f1(x, y), f2(x, y), g(x, y)), i.e., there exists a protocol
in which each user transmits one message each that is a
randomized function of its own input. This means that, for
every  > 0, there exists M1,M2, and a large enough n such
that
M1 −Xn − Y n −M2, (19)
H(Y nX |M1,M2, Xn) ≤ n, (20)
H(Y nX |M1,M2, Y n) ≤ n, (21)
I(M1,M2;Y
n
X¯) ≤ n, (22)
where (20) and (21) uses Fano’s inequality [19, Theorem
2.10.1]. Notice that since we have the Markov chains Y nX −
(M2, X
n)−M1 and Y nX − (M1, Y n)−M2, (20) and (21) can
be written as
H(Y nX |M2, Xn) ≤ n, (23)
H(Y nX |M1, Y n) ≤ n. (24)
Let Y˜ = (Y˜0, Y˜1) = (Y¯0, Y1). Now, since pXY = pX¯Y = pXY˜
we have the following from (23) and (24):
H(Y nX¯ |M2, X¯n) ≤ n, (25)
H(Y˜ nX |M1, Y˜ n) ≤ n. (26)
Consider,
H(Y n|M2) = H(Y n|M2, Xn) (27)
= H(Y n0 , Y
n
1 |M2, Xn)
= H(Y nX , Y
n
X¯ |M2, Xn) (28)
≤ H(Y nX |M2, Xn) +H(Y nX¯ |M2, Xn)
≤ 2n, (29)
where (27) follows because (M1, Xn) is independent of
(M2, Y
n), (28) follows because conditioned on Xn, there is a
bijection between (Y n0 , Y
n
1 ) and (Y
n
X , YX¯), (29) follows from
(23) and (25). Next consider,
H(Xn|M1) = H(Xn|M1, Y n) (30)
= H(Y nX , Y˜
n
X |M1, Y n) (31)
≤ H(Y nX |M1, Y n) +H(Y˜ nX |M1, Y n)
≤ 2n, (32)
where (30) follows because (M1, Xn) is independent of
(M2, Y
n), (31) follows because conditioned on Y n, there is a
bijection between Xn and (Y nX , Y˜
n
X), and (32) follows from
(24) and (26). Now H(Xn|M1) ≤ 2n and H(Y n|M2) ≤ 2n
implies that H(Y n
X¯
|M1,M2) ≤ 4n. This is a contradiction to
(22).
Notice that if we allow interactive communication, the tu-
ple (pXY , f1(x, y), f2(x, y), g(x, y)) is asymptotically securely
computable. To see this, note that M1 = Xn and M2 = Y nX
satisfies the secrecy constraint (18) (in fact with  = 0). This
completes the example.
In our notation, Tyagi et al. [13, Theorem 2] state that
(pXY , g(x, y), g(x, y), g(x, y)) is asymptotically securely com-
putable if
H(g(X,Y )) < I(X;Y ) (33)
(and only if H(g(X,Y )) ≤ I(X;Y )). We make the following
observation.
Theorem 3. If pXY and the function g(x, y) are
such that H(g(X,Y )) < I(X;Y ), then the tuple
(pXY , f1(x, y), f2(x, y), g(x, y)) is asymptotically securely
computable for any functions f1(x, y) and f2(x, y).
Tyagi et al. [13, Theorem 2] showed that if (33) is
satisfied, then omniscience can be attained using non-interactive
communication that is almost independent of Gn (in the sense
of (18)). The proof of Theorem 3 follows from this and the fact
that the users can then (approximately) compute any functions
Fn1 and F
n
2 , respectively (even if f1 and f2 can be possibly
different from g).
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APPENDIX
Proof of Claim 1: Suppose a protocol is private against
Alice and Bob. Fix any input distribution pXY . Consider
p(m|f, x, g)
=
p(x,m, f, g)
p(f, x, g)
=
∑
y
p(x, y,m, f, g)∑
y,m
p(x, y,m, f, g)
=
∑
y
p(x, y)p(m|x, y)p(f |x, y)p(g|x, y)∑
m,y
p(x, y)p(m|x, y)p(f |x, y)p(g|x, y)
=
∑
y:g(x,y)=g
f(x,y)=f
p(x, y)p(m|x, y)
∑
m,y:g(x,y)=g
f(x,y)=f
p(x, y)p(m|x, y) (34)
Without loss of generality, assume that there exists y′ such that
f(x, y′) = f and g(x, y′) = g′ 6= g. Otherwise we trivially
have p(m|f, x, g) = p(m|f, x). Now, from the definition of
privacy, we have p(m|x, y) = p(m|x, y′), for y, y′ such that
f(x, y) = f(x, y′) = f and g(x, y) = g 6= g′ = g(x, y′).
This implies that p(m|x, y) is same for every y such that
f(x, y) = f . This observation reduces the expression in (34)
to p(m|x, y) such that f(x, y) = f . Thus, we have
p(m|f, x, g) = p(m|x, y) for y s.t. f(x, y) = f. (35)
Consider
p(m|f, x) =
∑
y
p(x, y,m, f)∑
m,y
p(x, y,m, f)
=
∑
y:f(x,y)=f
p(x, y)p(m|x, y)∑
m,y
p(x, y)p(m|x, y)
= p(m|x, y) for y s.t. f(x, y) = f, (36)
where the last equality follows from the same observation
mentioned above (35), i.e., p(m|x, y) is same for every
y such that f(x, y) = f . From (35) and (36), we have
p(m|f, x, g) = p(m|f, x), for p(f, x, g) > 0 which is equiva-
lent to I(M ;G|F,X) = 0. Similarly, privacy against Bob im-
plies that I(M ;H|F, Y ) = 0. For the other direction, suppose
that for all input distributions qXY , there exists a unique pM |XY
such that I(M ;G|F,X) = I(M ;H|F, Y ) = 0. Consider
(x, y1) and (x, y2) such that g(x, y1) = g1 6= g(x, y2) = g2
and f(x, y1) = f(x, y2) = f . Fix a pXY that is supported only
on (x, y1) and (x, y2). Consider
p(m|x, y1) = p(m|x, y1, g1, f)
= p(m|x, g1, f) (37)
= p(m|x, f) (38)
= p(m|x, g2, f) (39)
= p(m|x, y2, g2, f) (40)
= p(m|x, y2),
where (37) and (40) follow because under this input distribution,
G is a function of Y and vice versa, (38) and (39) follow
because I(M ;G|F,X) = 0. Similarly, we can show that
p(m|x1, y) = p(m|x2, y) for (x1, y) and (x2, y) such that
g(x1, y) 6= g(x2, y) and f(x1, y) = f(x2, y).
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